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Abstract 
In engineering design research different models of functional decomposition are advanced side-
by-side. In this paper I explain and validate this co-existence of models in terms of the Kuhnian 
thesis of methodological incommensurability. I advance this analysis in terms of the thesis’ 
construal of (non-algorithmic) theory choice in terms of values, expanding this notion to the 
engineering domain. I further argue that the (by some) implicated threat of the thesis to rational 
theory choice has no force in the functional decomposition case: co-existence of different models 
of functional decomposition is rational from an instrumental point of view. My explanation 
covers cases in which different models are advanced as means for the same objective. Such cases 
cannot be explicated with the explanatory construct of variety in objectives, as advanced in other 
analyses of co-existing conceptualizations in engineering. 
 
Keywords: Functional decomposition, co-existence, methodological incommensurability, 
rationality   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Engineering design research on the modeling of technical functions provides what seems to be a 
striking contrast with research in the sciences. Whereas research in the sciences exhibits an 
orientation toward establishing (increasingly) unambiguous and commonly shared concepts1 – 
and engages in debate about the adequacy of the conceptualizations proposed – functional 
modeling research does not, by and large, strive toward such conceptual uniformity nor engages 
in such debate. For instance, a key concept such as function lacks a uniform meaning in 
functional modeling research but, instead, is specific to particular modeling frameworks (cf. 
Erden et al. 2008). Models of functional decomposition, i.e., graphical representations of 
organized sets of functions, likewise come in a variety of flavors. And the majority of authors in 
functional modeling research accept this status quo. Some authors do aim to develop a common 
framework for functional modeling by means of specific functional conceptualizations (cf. Erden 
et al. 2008; Chandrasekaran 2005). Yet, most authors merely stick to advancing their favored 
frameworks without superiority claims over other ones. 
 
Philosophical analyses of the co-existence of different conceptualizations in engineering explain 
the maintaining of this status quo as having instrumental value to engineering (cf. Bucciarelli 
1994, 2003; Vermaas 2009; Van Eck 2010a). The analyses of Bucciarelli (1994, 2003) and 
Vermaas (2009) relate specific conceptualizations (as suitable means) to specific objectives, thus 
explaining (and validating) co-existence in terms of a variety of engineering ends. I have argued 
that the choice for and suitability of particular models of functional decomposition for particular 
objectives is influenced by whether or not specific design knowledge is employed in building 
these models, thus explaining (and validating) co-existence of different models in terms of 
variation in design knowledge employment (Van Eck 2010a). This latter analysis explains co-
existence in informative fashion insofar as the knowledge used in building models does not 
contain or refer to a specific notion of function or specific functional decomposition model. When 
the knowledge used does already refer to a specific notion of function or specific model of 
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functional decomposition, the choice for (the construction of) specific models is obvious, but 
explication of such choices in terms of knowledge employment would become circular.  
 
In this paper I further expand on the above analyses. Focusing on research on the modeling of 
functional decompositions, I argue that different functional decomposition models are also 
advanced in the engineering literature as means for the same objective. What to think of co-
existence in this case? The questions that I will address are (i) why co-existence of different 
models obtains when the objective for which they are constructed is the same (rather than fixing a 
single best and commonly shared model) and (ii) whether the above implicated value of co-
existence also holds in the case of co-existing and different models that are constructed for the 
same objective? 
 
The previous analyses of co-existence that put forward variety in objectives as a central 
explanatory construct do not cover the above case(s) in which different functional decomposition 
models are used side-by-side as means toward the same objective.  And neither does an 
explanation in terms of variation in design knowledge employment, since the models advanced in 
the above case are built using knowledge that already refers to specific models of functional 
decomposition. I will therefore follow a different tack to explain this case. I explain co-existence 
in this functional decomposition case in terms of the Kuhnian thesis of methodological 
incommensurability.2 Key to this thesis is the notion that there is no neutral algorithm that 
governs scientific theory choice. Kuhn (1977) argued that theoretical disputes between advocates 
of rival frameworks cannot be solved by recourse to a neutral algorithm that dictates theory 
choice, since there is no commonly shared set of criteria or standards available on the basis of 
which such a choice can be forged.  Kuhn (1977) pressed the point that such standards do not 
function as algorithmic rules by which one is able to determine theory choice but, rather, as 
values guiding such choices. I explain co-existence in terms of (and by expanding on) Kuhn’s 
notion that one can explain divergence of theory choice in terms of variation in values. I argue 
that the choice for particular models of functional decomposition depends on the engineering 
values that are employed in choosing/evaluating them, and that these engineering values vary 
(and conflict) between modeling accounts. I conclude that the functional decomposition case 
exemplifies methodological incommensurability in the engineering domain. 
 
Kuhn’s analysis of values, in addition, led him to conclude that scientists’ choice of (competing) 
theories can be considered rational. This conclusion has spawned extensive debate in philosophy 
of science. A key issue is whether in the absence of a commonly shared algorithm scientists’ 
choice of theories can in fact be considered rational (Kuhn 1977). Thus, authors that accept 
variation in values are pressed to show that theory choice by means of values ensures the 
rationality of scientists’ choice of theories (Worrall 1988; Sankey 1995, 2002). I will address this 
issue in the functional decomposition case. I argue that the choice and usage of different models 
by different engineers is rational from a practical point of view. I construct this argument along 
the lines of a position developed by Sankey (2002) in which he combines variation of values with 
a means-end analysis of values. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I briefly present an overview of engineering 
notions of function and models of functional decomposition. Section 3 introduces the earlier 
analyses of co-existence. In section 4 I explain co-existence in terms of the thesis of 
methodological incommensurability. I argue for the rational grounds of co-existence in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Engineering Notions of Function and Functional Decomposition 
 
The concept of function has a flexible meaning in the engineering domain. An analysis of 
Vermaas (2009) established three archetypical ones: behavior functions that refer to the desired 
behaviors of a device, effect functions that refer to the desired effects of the behaviors of a 
device, and purpose functions that refer to the purposes for which a device is designed. And, in 
addition, I identified a fourth (Van Eck 2009/2010): action functions that refer to intentional 
behaviors carried out by an agent using a device. 
  
Behavior function descriptions characterize conversions of matter and/or energy in which 
physical conservation laws are taken into account, thus referring to physical behaviors. An 
electric screwdriver’s function of ‘converting electricity into torque and heat’ (Stone and Wood 
2000: 364), for instance, in which the energy of the electricity is supposed to equal the sum of the 
energies of heat and torque. Effect function descriptions also characterize (features of) behavior 
but do not take conservation laws into account, referring only to the desired effects of behavior. 
In case of a screwdriver’s function, say, ‘producing torque’. Purpose function descriptions refer to 
states of affairs intended by designers that are the final result(s) of behaviors. In the screwdriver 
case, say, ‘having a rotational force down a shaft’.3 Finally, action function descriptions are used 
to characterize user actions with a device; again in the screwdriver case, say, ’manually inserting 
a screw in a screw bit’.   
 
These four notions of function are also described in engineering models of functional 
decomposition, i.e., graphical representations of organized sets of functions. Engineers put such 
models to a variety of uses. They use them, among others, in the conceptual phase of engineering 
designing to specify the desired functions of some artifact-to-be (Stone and Wood 2000; 
Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001); in the reverse engineering of existing artifacts to identify their 
functions (Otto and Wood 2001); and engineers use functional decomposition models to identify 
malfunctions of artifacts (Bell et al. 2007). 
 
In this paper I consider three distinct engineering models of functional decomposition: a 
functional decomposition model of an organized set of behavior functions (behavior function 
fmD), a functional decomposition model of an organized set of effect functions (effect function 
fmD), and a functional decomposition model of an organized set of purpose functions (purpose 
function fmD).4 Examples of such models are given in Figures 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Techné 15:2 Spring 2011                                                                  van Eck, Incommensurability and Rationality... / 
 
121	  
import 
solid
import 
solid
import 
solid
import 
human 
force
stop 
rotational 
energy
store 
solid
transmit 
human 
force
convert 
human force 
to rotation
position 
solid
export 
solid
transmit 
transl. 
energy
hand
Human force
Staple full
hand
hand
staples
Staple 
empty
Stapled 
sheet
hand
Staple 
module
sheet
Human 
force
Grip 
module
Pin 
module
Rot.- 
translational 
module
Lock 
module
 
 Figure 1. Behavior function fmD of a stapler (adopted from Stone et al. 2004) 
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 Figure 2. Effect function fmD of a stapler (adopted from Ookubo et al. 2007) 
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Figure 3. Purpose function fmD of a terminal insertion device (adapted from Deng 2002)5 
 
3. Explaining Co-existence by Variation of Objectives or Design Knowledge Employment 
 
Philosophical analyses of the usage, side-by-side, of different conceptualizations explicate this 
co-existence as having instrumental value to engineering (cf. Bucciarelli 1994, 2003; Vermaas 
2009; Van Eck 2010a). These analyses either relate specific conceptualizations (as suitable 
means) to specific objectives, or explicate the suitability of specific conceptualizations (as 
suitable means) to specific objectives in terms of design knowledge usage.  
 
3.1. Object Worlds 
 
Based on analyses of several cases of actual engineering design practice, Bucciarelli advances the 
argument that engineers practice their trades in different “object worlds” (Bucciareli 1994: 62; 
Bucciarelli 2003: 99). The notion of an object world(s) conveys: “the idea that different 
participants in design see the object of design differently depending upon their competencies, 
responsibilities and their technical interests” (Bucciarelli 2003: 99). Engineers from specific 
technical disciplines use conceptual frameworks in designing that are specific to their 
specialization; between technical disciplines there are differences in, amongst others, standards, 
regulations, mathematics, computer tools, and sketching and modeling tools (Bucciarelli 2003). 
Exponents from different disciplines hence will conceptualize an object of design in different 
ways. And they may also interpret a concept or notion that is shared across object worlds in 
different ways. As Bucciarelli (2003) illustrates: “the same object, say a prismatic bar, to the 
structural engineer is a cantilever beam while to the person responsible for ensuring that the 
system does not overheat, it is a radiating appendage” (99). These different conceptualizations 
have value since engineers from different object worlds work on different features of the object of 
design for which the adopted conceptualizations are useful (Bucciarelli 2003: 9). Phrased 
differently, these conceptualizations are useful for achieving specific objectives. For instance, the 
above conceptualization of a prismatic bar as a radiating appendage is useful when one’s 
objective is preventing a system to overheat, whereas a cantilever beam-conceptualization serves 
other ends. 
 
Although conceptualizations between object worlds may be at variance in a given case of 
designing, requiring negotiation to arrive at design decisions (Bucciarelli 2003: 101), these co-
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existing conceptualizations thus can be validated in terms of their being useful means to achieve a 
variety of objectives.  
 
Whereas the above work of Bucciarelli validates co-existing conceptualizations between distinct 
engineering disciplines, the analyses of Vermaas (2009) and myself (2010a) support such 
conceptual divergence within an engineering discipline, to wit: functional modeling in electro-
mechanical engineering. 
 
3.2. Simplifying Full Descriptions of Technical Artifacts 
 
Vermaas (2009) argues that specific meanings of the concept of technical function are used in 
engineering to advance specific descriptions of technical artifacts. Since these descriptions are all 
useful to engineering, he thus explains why the concept of function is used with more than one 
meaning in the field. He develops his analysis in terms of the notions of a full and a simplified 
description of a technical artifact. Vermaas identifies five key concepts in full descriptions of 
technical artifacts: goals of agents that refer to states in the world that agents desire to realize by 
using artifacts; actions that refer to intentional behaviors that agents carry out when using 
artifacts; functions that refer to desired roles played by artifacts; behaviors that refer to 
physicochemical state changes of artifacts; and structures that refer to the physicochemical 
materials and fields of artifacts, their configurations, and their interactions.   
 
Vermaas (2009) argues that the flexible meaning of the concept of function affords different ways 
in which such full descriptions of technical artifacts can be simplified. Full descriptions in terms 
of the five key concepts are elaborate, and in particular engineering settings it makes sense to 
simplify them by “by-passing” one or more of the key concepts (Vermaas 2009: 2.119). Key to 
the analysis is that specific meanings of function are advantageous to specific by-passing 
simplifications. For instance, relative to the five key concepts, the concepts of action and 
behavior are by-passed in the account of Stone and Wood (2000) and the concept of function is 
used in its meaning of desired behavior (by specifying the role an artifact should play in terms of 
its behavior) to relate goals to structure. The concept of behavior is thus bypassed and the concept 
of function is instead used to refer to behavior(s). On the other hand, in the account of Lind 
(1994) the key concept of action is by-passed but not the concept of behavior. In this approach the 
concept of function is used in its meaning of desired effect of behavior (by specifying the role of 
the artifact in terms of the effects of the artifact’s behavior) to relate goals to behavior.  
 
This analysis thus explains co-existing meanings of the concept of function (and the accounts in 
which these meanings are advanced) as useful for the advancement of different simplified 
descriptions of technical artifacts (objectives), all valuable to engineering. 
 
3.3. fmD  Choice and Knowledge Usage 
 
In a similar vein, but focusing on the notion of design knowledge usage, I have argued that the 
choice for (constructing) particular fmDs (behavior function fmDs, effect function fmDs, and 
purpose function fmDs) is influenced by whether or not particular design knowledge is employed 
in their construction. And that depending on the particulars of such design knowledge 
employment, particular models are best suited for achieving particular design objectives (Van 
Eck 2010a). I thus explained and defended the keeping of different fmDs side-by-side (and the 
accounts in which they are advanced) in engineering design in terms of variation in design 
knowledge employment. 
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Among others, I considered fmDs that are used to support the objective of innovative design, 
characterized as the designing of new artifacts that have potentially novel (combinations of) 
function-structure connections (e.g. Pahl and Beitz 1988; Stone and Wood 2000). Pahl and Beitz 
(1988) and Stone and Wood (2000) explicitly do not employ known function-structure 
connections (nor behavior-structure connections) in the construction of fmDs, but establish such 
function-structure mappings after the completion of fmDs. I argued that since known function-
structure connections are not taken into account in the construction phase, behavior function fmDs 
are best suited for the above objective since behavior function descriptions (which may include 
effects) are detailed enough to support the selection of (potentially novel) structures after the 
model is constructed. Purpose function fmDs and effect function fmDs, instead, are too coarse-
grained to allow the selection of (potentially novel) structures in any precise way, when existing 
knowledge on function-structure connections is not considered in the construction phase of such 
models. The use of such models, skipping reference to behaviors and effects in purpose function 
fmDs and to behaviors in effect function fmDs, does not give (in a precise manner) those 
(potentially novel) structures that are suitable to achieve the functions of an artifact-to-be. For 
instance, a car’s headlight effect-function “light on” may be suitable to select well-known 
structures such as an incandescent lamp or halogen one, but without a desired behavioral 
specification, the choice for, say, a more recent LED lamp (which differs in its behaviors by 
which the effect “light on” results) is less obvious. 
 
On the other hand, I argued that other fmDs get favored when their construction is based on 
employing known (and required) behavior-structure relations of an existing artifact. For instance, 
for the objective of design analysis, characterized as verifying whether the functions of an artifact 
are achieved by the behaviors of the artifact in the intended manner, fmDs that are constructed 
based on known behavior-structure relations are used (e.g. Lind 1994; Bell et al. 2007). Given 
that both behavior and structure of an artifact are known, effect function fmDs are suited for 
verifying whether the behaviors exercised by structures achieve (in the intended fashion) the 
functions that are desired. Using a purpose function fmD, instead, skipping reference to effects, 
does not give the precision to ascertain whether or not the functions are indeed manifested in the 
intended way by the behaviors of the artifact. For instance, the purpose function “illumination in a 
room” may be sufficient for determining whether the behavior of the artifact implements this 
function. Yet, it is not suited to verify whether the behavior of the artifact implements this 
function in the intended way. In contrast, an effect function description, say, “switch on-light on”, 
is suited for verifying whether the behavior of the artifact implements this function in the 
intended way: say, the switch might be “off” while the light is still on. Such a failure goes 
undetected with the purpose function description “illumination in a room” (more elaborate 
behavior function fmDs may also do the trick, but seem unnecessarily complex). Hence, given that 
behavior and structure of an artifact are known, effect function fmDs are best suited for verifying 
whether the functions of an artifact are achieved by the behaviors of the artifact in the intended 
manner. 
 
My analysis, like the ones of Bucciarelli (1994) and Vermaas (2009), shows the instrumental 
value of maintaining co-existence, in casu of different fmDs:  depending on the specifics of the 
design knowledge employed, particular models are best suited for achieving particular 
objectives.6 This explanation however holds (in informative fashion) for certain cases only. That 
is, insofar as the knowledge used in building models does not contain or refer to a specific notion 
of function or fmD, co-existence of models can be understood in terms of variation in knowledge 
usage. Yet, when the knowledge used does already refer to a specific notion of function or fmD, 
the choice for (the construction of) specific models is obvious, but explicating such choices in 
terms of knowledge employment would become circular. For instance, in the case of the objective 
of routine designing (characterized as the designing of new artifacts by using knowledge of 
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function-structure connections of existing types of the to-be-designed artifact) Deng (2002) puts 
forward purpose function fmDs that are build using known connections between purpose functions 
and structures as means toward this objective. Since these connections are known and employed, 
purpose function fmDs are obviously opted for. However, explicating the choice for these fmDs in 
terms of the usage of known purpose function-structure connections would introduce circularity 
in the explanation. Moreover, as I will argue in the next section, effect function fmDs and behavior 
function fmDs that are also built using connections between these notions of function and 
structure, respectively, are advanced as well as means toward this objective of routine designing. 
Hence, different explanatory constructs than variety in objectives and variation in knowledge 
usage are needed to explain cases such as these. These constructs do not provide the requisite 
explanatory leverage when one wants to explain why different fmDs are used side-by-side as 
means for achievement of the same objective, and the knowledge used to build them already 
refers to specific notions of function or fmD. In such cases, other explanatory constructs are 
needed. The work of Kuhn and others on methodological incommensurability and the dynamics 
of theory choice provide concepts suited to explicate such cases, as I will argue in the next 
section. 
 
4. Methodological Incommensurability in Engineering 
 
Kuhn (1970: 148-150) initially used the term incommensurability in a holistic fashion to capture 
methodological, observational, and conceptual incompatibilities between successive scientific 
paradigms. In later work (e.g. Kuhn 1991) he narrowed down and specified his notion of 
incommensurability further in terms of differences in the taxonomic structure of successive 
scientific theories. On this “semantic” reading of incommensurability, translation failure occurs 
between kind terms of competing theories due to the unmatchable classificatory 
schemes/taxonomic structures underlying these theories (Kuhn 1991). In such cases, theories 
classify the same objects into different kinds, the members of which are (taken to be) governed by 
different natural laws. Translation of kind terms between theories then will fail since the nomic 
expectations attached to these terms are incompatible between theories. For instance, Ptolemy’s 
theory classifies the sun as a planet, where planets orbit around the earth, whereas Copernicus’ 
theory classifies the sun as a star, where planets orbit stars. A Copernican claim such as planets 
orbiting the sun is incompatible with Ptolemy’s framework, hence translation of the kind term 
‘sun’ between these theories will fail (Kuhn 1991: 94). 
 
As Kuhn’s later treatment of incommensurability focused mainly on semantic aspects, some 
commentators began to distinguish two different notions of incommensurability: on the one hand 
the above-mentioned semantic incommensurability and on the other “methodological” 
incommensurability, which involves epistemic standards that are used to evaluate competing 
theories (Kuhn 1970, 1977; cf. Sankey 1999; Carrier 2008; Soler 2008; Oberheim and 
Hoyningen-Huene 2009).  
 
4.1. Methodological Incommensurability 
 
The development of the thesis of methodological incommensurability is traced back to Kuhn’s (as 
well as Feyerabend’s) rejection of the view held by both the Logical Positivist movement and 
Popper that a distinguishing feature of science is the use of a uniform scientific method that 
remains fixed throughout scientific development, and on the basis of which theory choice can be 
determined unambiguously (Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene 2009; cf. Kuhn 1970: 94, 103).7 
Kuhn challenged the view of an invariant scientific method that is capable of governing theory 
choice in such unambiguous fashion. He argued, instead, that standards or criteria of theory 
appraisal, such as accuracy, consistency, fruitfulness, scope, and simplicity (1977: 322) depend 
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on and vary between paradigms. Kuhn pressed the point that such standards do not function as 
algorithmic rules that are able to determine theory choice but rather as values that only guide it 
(1977: 331). Epistemic values refer to characteristics or properties of scientific theories that are 
considered desirable by scientists relative to their objectives. The history of science shows that 
disputes between advocates of rival theoretical frameworks are not solved by recourse to a neutral 
algorithm that is capable of dictating theory choice, since there is no commonly shared set of 
criteria or standards available on the basis of which such a choice can be forged (Kuhn 1970, 
1977).8 Based on this construal of theory choice in terms of values and the observation that 
scientists (can) differ in the values they employ, Kuhn (1977) concluded that scientists may 
rationally disagree in theory choice. This disagreement may have different sources. First, 
advocates of rival scientific frameworks may differ in the values they employ in theory choice 
and appraisal. Second, values may conflict when applied to concrete cases of theory choice. For 
instance, scope may favor one theory, yet simplicity another. Theory choice then entails assigning 
weight/relevance to such values, which advocates of rival frameworks may do so in different 
fashion. Third, advocates of rival scientific frameworks may also interpret the content of values 
differently. What is, for instance, precisely meant when one speaks about accuracy? Based on 
these considerations, Kuhn (1970, 1977) concluded that there is no commonly shared algorithm 
available for theory choice. 
 
Summing up, key elements of this position are the closely related notions of “non-algorithmic 
theory choice” and “methodological variation” (Sankey 1995, 2002), that is, variation in how 
and/or which (set of) values are employed in theory choice. Furthermore, the theories in question 
are advanced to meet what we may call a ‘common objective’: they purport to explain the same 
(or substantially overlapping) range of phenomena (e.g. Soler: 2008). I use (and expand on) the 
notion of variation in values in section 4.2 to explain co-existence of different engineering fmDs 
that are advanced as means to achieve a common objective.9 
 
My earlier explanation of co-existence in terms of variation in knowledge usage (section 3.3) also 
hinges upon (though not phrased as such), in an engineering-modeling rather than a scientific-
theoretical context, the idea of variation in values: knowledge usage specifics, such as employing 
known function-structure connections or behavior-structure relations during the construction of 
fmDs correspond to values engineers have that influence their choices for particular models. These 
values are not ones that are operative in a scientific-theoretical context (epistemic values) but they 
do function similarly, in an engineering-modeling context, as factors that influence engineers 
their choices for particular fmDs. Let us capture this similarity by calling such factors engineering-
values, or “e-values” for short. I define an engineering value as a characteristic or property of a 
functional decomposition model or a functional decomposition strategy that is considered 
desirable by an engineer relative to an objective.10,11 However, as indicated in section 3.3, e-
values relating to knowledge usage do not provide the requisite explanatory leverage in the case 
of routine designing. I consider other e-values to explicate this case. 
 
4.2. Incommensurability in Engineering: the Case of Functional Decomposition and Routine 
Designing 
 
In the engineering literature, in the electro-mechanical domain, different fmDs are advanced as 
means for achieving the (common) objective of “routine design”: behavior function fmDs 
(Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001), effect function fmDs (Kitamura and Mizoguchi 2003), as well as 
purpose function fmDs (Deng et al. 2000a, 2000b; Deng 2002) are put forward as means for 
achieving this objective.12 In the above accounts in which these particular models are advanced 
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this objective is characterized as the designing of new artifacts by using knowledge of function-
structure connections of existing types of the to-be-designed artifact (references see above).  
 
4.2.1. Variation of e-Values 
 
Analysis of these accounts shows that their developers advance different e-values that their 
proposed fmDs are to satisfy. These e-values are given in Table 1. 
 
 
Structural compatibility The spatial organization that an fmD provides must be such that 
all functions of the structures contained in the spatial 
organization are achieved 
Function-behavior 
independency 
Descriptions of functions in an fmD should be such that they do 
not describe their underlying behavior and are organized in sets 
in terms of knowledge of their underlying behavior 
Function-to-function 
independency 
The functions in an fmD must be independent from one another in 
the sense that realization of a given function by a structure is 
(considered to be) independent from realization of other 
function(s), and vice versa 
 
Table 1: e-values employed in fmD choice 
 
In the Chakrabarti-Bligh (CB) account fmDs must satisfy the e-value of what we may call 
‘structural compatibility’. The (input-output) organization of functions in an fmD also provides a 
spatial organization of the structures that achieve them.13 And the spatial organization that a 
model provides must be such that any negative interactions between structures (as a result of 
which structures would fail to achieve their functions) do not occur, so that all the functions of the 
structures contained in the spatial organization are achieved (Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001). In 
other words, structures contained in the spatial organization provided by an fmD must be 
compatible with one another.14  
 
In the Functional Concept Ontology (FCO) account (Kitamura and Mizoguchi 2003; Kitamura et 
al. 2005/6; Kitamura et al. 2007) another e-value, which we may call ‘function-behavior 
independency’ is emphasized. This e-value prescribes that descriptions of functions in fmDs 
should be such that they do not describe their underlying behavior and are organized in sets in 
terms of knowledge of their underlying behavior (descriptions that do refer to underlying 
behavior are coined “quasi-functions”). These authors distinguish the concept of function from 
the concept of behavior. And in fmDs those functions that make up another function are grouped 
together (organized) in sets based on knowledge of their underlying behavior and structure, thus 
distinguishing functional from behavioral descriptions.   
 
Yet another e-value is emphasized in the Dual Stage (DS) account (Deng et al. 2000a, 2000b; 
Deng 2002), which we may call ‘function-to-function independency’. This e-value prescribes that 
the functions in an fmD must be independent from one another in the sense that realization of a 
given function by a structure does not depend on the (prior) realization of another function by 
another structure (Deng 2002). For instance, a washing machine’s function of ‘washing laundry’ 
can be independent (for its realization) from its function of ‘drying laundry’ (Deng 2002). (In this 
account, the behaviors underlying the functions in an fmD are not considered to be independent, 
but causally related).  
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As can be seen, different e-values for fmDs hold in these accounts. This variation in e-values 
provides means to explain the choice for/construction of different fmDs in these accounts, as I will 
argue below.   
 
4.2.2. Explaining fmD  Choice by e-values 
 
Given the emphasis in the CB account on the e-value of structural compatibility, one can 
understand why behavior functions fmDs are (chosen to be) developed. When the spatial 
organization that an fmD provides must be such that any negative interactions between structures 
(as a result of which structures would fail to realize their functions) do not occur, behavior 
function fmDs are best equipped to provide such a spatial organization. Such fmDs contain the 
details needed for assessing whether the output characteristics of one structure’s function 
match/are compatible with the input characteristics of another structure’s function. Say, the heat 
generated when energy is converted into torque by an electric screwdriver’s motor may 
negatively interact with the electrical wiring connected to the motor, possibly leading to failure of 
their ‘transmitting electricity’ function (and hence the motor’s function as well). Purpose and 
effect function fmDs seem too course-grained to satisfy this e-value of structural compatibility. 
For instance, the effect function ‘produce torque’ of a screwdriver’s motor does not contain the 
information required to assess its compatibility with the electrical wiring  
 
In the FCO account, on the other hand, structural compatibility is already assumed to be in place. 
In these fmDs, those functions that make up another function are grouped together (organized) in 
sets based on knowledge of their underlying behavior and structure (Kitamura et al. 2005/6). One 
needs to assume that the structures (and behaviors) underlying the functions in fmDs are 
compatible for otherwise sets of functions making up/achieving other functions would fail to do 
so (these authors make this assumption: fmDs are models of existing and working artifacts). 
 
In the DS account, structural compatibility is not something that fmDs should satisfy. Rather, in 
this account, both the assembly of structures and the verification of whether assembled structures 
meet the design requirements take place in later design phases after fmDs are constructed (Deng 
2002).15 
 
Next to the structural compatibility assumption, fmDs in the FCO account must satisfy the e-value 
of function-behavior independency. Given this e-value one can understand why effect function 
fmDs are developed. When descriptions of functions in fmDs must be such that they do not 
describe their underlying behavior and are organized in terms of their underlying behavior (and 
structure), behavior function fmDs will (obviously) not be opted for since the functions in such 
models describe behaviors. And since functions in fmDs are grouped together based on knowledge 
of their underlying behavior and structure one can also understand why purpose function fmDs are 
not chosen. By using purpose function fmDs, in which functions refer to states of affairs that are 
the final result(s) of behavior, one skips reference to the more immediate effects of behaviors and 
structures. Compared with effect function fmDs, the grouping of functions in sets based on their 
underlying behavior and structure is less straightforwardly established with such purpose function 
fmDs.  In the latter case, the connection between function-behavior-structure is less 
straightforward. For instance, the purpose function “to tell time” can be achieved by a wide 
variety of behaviors and structures. The effect function description “rotate arms in clockwise 
direction” on the other hand is more easily connectable to specific behaviors and structures (and 
sets of such functions thus more straightforwardly organized in terms of behavioral and structural 
knowledge). 
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In the CB account, this function-behavior independency is not an e-value that fmDs must satisfy. 
On the contrary, as we saw, in these fmDs functions refer to behaviors. Neither do fmDs satisfy this 
e-value in the DS account. Functions in purpose function fmDs are not organized in terms of 
knowledge of their underlying behavior (what they do have in common with fmDs in the FCO 
account is that functions in DS fmDs do not describe their underlying behavior since they 
characterize states of affairs that are the final results of behaviors).  
 
Given the third e-value of function-to-function independency that fmDs in the DS account must 
satisfy, one can understand why purpose function fmDs are developed. When functions in an fmD 
are required to be independent from one another in the sense that realization of a given function is 
independent from the realization of other function(s), and vice versa, purpose function fmDs seem 
most suited. Such models allow one to conceive most clearly of the realization of functions as 
being independent from the realization of other functions. For instance, realization of the 
behavior function ‘transmitting torque’ of an electric screwdriver requires, say, prior realization 
of the behavior function ‘converting electricity into torque’. Similarly, realization of the electric 
screwdriver’s effect function ‘produce torque’ requires, say, prior realization of the effect 
function ‘generate electricity’. In contrast, realization of the purpose function of, say, ‘having a 
rotational force’ is more easily conceived as independent from the realization of other functions. 
Hence, models of purpose functions satisfy this e-value best.  
 
In contrast, function-to-function independency is not an e-value in the FCO account since 
functions in fmDs that jointly achieve another function are grouped in sets (based on knowledge of 
their underlying behavior and structure) and hence not (considered to be) independently realized. 
FmDs in the CB account also do not satisfy this e-value. Functions in fmDs are organized in terms 
of their input-output characterizations and thus for their realization dependent on one another 
(and on the structural compatibility of their underlying structures). This analysis is summarized 
graphically in Table 2.   
 
 Structural 
compatibility 
Function-
behavior 
independency 
Function-to-
function 
independency 
 
CB account + - - Behavior function 
fmD  
FCO account + + - Effect function 
fmD 
DS account - - + Purpose function 
fmD 
 
Table 2: e-values and fmD choice 
 
4.2.3. Co-existence and Methodological Incommensurability 
 
Summing up, in these accounts different e-values are considered important, due to which 
different fmDs are chosen for routine designing: behavior function fmDs in the CB account, effect 
function fmDs in the FCO account, and purpose function fmDs in the DS account. And, in addition, 
some of these e-values conflict: function-to-function independency applies to DS purpose 
function fmDs but not to CB behavior and FCO effect function fmDs; and function-behavior 
independency applies to FCO effect function fmDs but not to DS purpose function and CB 
behavior function fmDs. Of the three sources that each leads to methodological 
incommensurability (see section 4.1), two engineering variants can be identified in this case: (1) 
variation in and (2) conflict between e-values. Due to both this variety of and conflict between e-
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values, there is in this case no commonly shared algorithm available that governs engineers’ their 
choices of fmDs. This choice, rather, is seen to be dependent on the e-values that engineers adopt. 
This divergence of e-values thus explains the co-existence of different fmDs that are advanced as 
means to achieve a common objective. I submit that this functional decomposition case 
exemplifies an instance of methodological incommensurability in the engineering domain.16  
 
In a similar vein as Kuhn (1970, 1977, 1983) explained scientists’ choices for different theories in 
terms of differences in epistemic values, I thus offer an explanation why different fmDs are used 
side-by-side in engineering in terms of variation in e-values. Kuhn’s analysis of values, in 
addition, led him to conclude that scientists’ choice of (competing) theories can be considered 
rational. This conclusion has spawned extensive debate in philosophy of science (Kuhn 1977; 
McMullin 1983; Laudan 1987; Worrall 1988: Sankey 1995, 2002). Initially, a key issue was 
whether in the absence of a commonly shared algorithm scientists’ choice of theories can in fact 
be considered rational. More recently, this debate has shifted in orientation: both advocates of a 
single method for theory choice and authors that accept variation in values are pressed to show 
that their preferred single method or spectrum of values ensure the rationality of scientists’ choice 
of theories (Worrall 1988; Sankey 1995, 2002). 
 
I will address this issue in the engineering functional decomposition case: can engineers’ choices 
for different fmDs be considered rational from an instrumental point of view? I will argue that 
variation in e-values ensures that the choice and usage of different fmDs by different engineers is 
rational from a practical point of view.  
 
5. Rationality in Engineering 
 
5.1. Values and Theoretical Rationality 
 
Kuhn (1983) took the position that the rationality of scientists’ choice of theories is ensured by 
the concept of science itself (see also Sankey 1999). Kuhn’s position has however been criticized 
on the grounds that he never satisfactorily addressed the challenge to explicate how variation in 
epistemic values ensures rational theory choice (Hempel 1983; Sankey 1999). In the case of 
values, the challenge is to show that the values one considers are appropriate ones for the 
evaluation and choice of scientific theories. A value is considered appropriate for theory choice if 
a theory that satisfies a particular value contributes to the attainment of a scientific objective (that 
one aims to achieve with the theory) precisely because the theory satisfies that value (Hempel 
1983; McMullin 1983; Sankey 2002). Stated differently, that the (desired) characteristics or 
properties of the chosen theory indeed are the features by means of which the theory contributes 
to attainment of an objective that one aims to achieve with the theory. Insofar as values are 
appropriate, maintaining variation of these values in theory choice is considered rational. 
Advocates of value variation consider such means-end interpretations of values an asset (Laudan 
1987; Teller 2008). It allows for the possibility to rationally compare the merits of competing 
theories (or scientific models): this theory/model is better with respect to this value, that 
theory/model is better with respect to that value.  
 
Several interpretations of such means-end relationships between epistemic values and scientific 
objectives are given in philosophy of science. Some assert that appropriate values contribute to 
the attainment of a main or ultimate objective of science, such as empirical adequacy or truth 
(McMullin 1983). Others do not invoke the notion of an ultimate objective and argue that specific 
values contribute to more specific objectives (Laudan 1987; Teller 2008). Sankey (2002) gives a 
third interpretation by combining the two interpretations above. Sankey views these more specific 
objectives as subordinate to a main or ultimate objective of science, which in his book is 
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advancement on the truth. He takes the achievement of subordinate objectives as sub serving this 
main or ultimate objective of science. In Sankey’s scheme on thus finds epistemic values, their 
related subordinate objectives, and a common ultimate objective 
 
Based on this means-end interpretation of epistemic values, Sankey (2002) defends 
methodological variation: insofar as values are conducive to the realization of their related 
subordinate objectives, maintaining variation of these values in theory choice is rational.17  
 
I use and expand on Sankey’s means-end analysis of epistemic values, specifically his distinction 
between subordinate objectives and a main objective, to show that the e-values that I consider are 
appropriate ones for the evaluation and choice of fmDs. In the engineering case I speak of sub 
objectives rather than subordinate ones. As I will argue in the next section, this analysis indicates 
that engineers’ choices for different fmDs are rational from an instrumental point of view. 
 
5.2. e-Values and Practical Rationality 
 
I will demonstrate in the following that an fmD that satisfies a particular e-value contributes to the 
attainment of the objective for which the fmD is used precisely because it satisfies that e-value, 
i.e., that the (desired) characteristics or properties of the chosen fmD indeed are (among) the 
features by means of which the model contributes to attainment of the objective for which it is 
used. To demonstrate that fmDs satisfying the e-values that I consider are suitable means to 
achieve the objectives for which they are used, I distinguish between main and sub objectives of 
engineers. I argue that different fmDs, precisely because they satisfy particular e-values, directly 
contribute to the attainment of particular sub objectives and indirectly, via the achievement of sub 
objectives, to main objectives. This analysis in terms of sub objectives makes it insightful how 
different fmDs that satisfy different (and conflicting) e-values all contribute to a common main 
objective. This analysis thus also indicates that specific models have specific advantages: 
depending on the e-values and sub objectives that engineers have, specific fmDs are better than 
others. By implication, my analysis shows that the usage of different fmDs by different engineers 
is rational from a practical point of view.  
 
Returning to the first e-value of structural compatibility that is satisfied by fmDs in the CB 
account, we can explicate these fmDs as contributing to a sub objective of what we may call 
“accuracy”, to wit: that all the functions in an fmD are realized. In order for this sub objective to 
be achieved an fmD must satisfy structural compatibility: the spatial organization that an fmD 
provides must be such that any negative interactions between structures do not occur, so that all 
the functions of the structures contained in the spatial organization are realized.18 Since this e-
value is already assumed to be satisfied in the FCO account, so is its related sub objective. In the 
DS account, this e-value and sub objective are addressed in later design stages after fmDs are 
constructed.  
 
In similar fashion we can interpret fmDs satisfying the e-value of function-behavior independency, 
as endorsed in the FCO account, as contributing to a sub objective of what we may call 
“knowledge management of design rationale”. This account aims to capture (rather ambitiously) 
the rationale of engineers that lies behind their construction of particular functional descriptions 
and fmDs (for archival and cross-communication purposes in design) (Sasajima et al. 1996; 
Kitamura et al. 2007). Capturing such “design rationale” is according to these authors in 
engineering done in an idiosyncratic fashion in the sense that its analysis depends on the 
considerations of the model builder. They aim to overcome this idiosyncrasy by developing 
systematic guidelines for the capturing of design rationale behind fmDs in more explicit and re-
usable fashion. Key assumption in the development of these guidelines is that of all the possible 
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input-output relations of technical behaviors only some input, output, or input-output relations are 
intended in a given context and hence will be used for developing functional descriptions and 
fmDs. They also define primitives to isolate those input, output, or input-output relations that are 
used to develop descriptions of functions and fmDs in particular contexts (Sasajima et al. 1996). 
Given this aim to capture design intent systematically, that is, the sub objective of “knowledge 
management of design rationale”, and this key assumption underlying it, we can interpret fmDs 
satisfying the e-value of function-behavior independency as contributing to this sub objective. 
Given this underlying assumption, fmDs satisfying the e-value of distinguishing function from its 
underlying behavior contribute to capturing design intent in systematic fashion. This e-value and 
sub objective are not emphasized in the CB and DS accounts.  
 
FmDs satisfying the e-value of function-to-function independency, as endorsed in the DS account, 
can be analyzed as contributing to a sub objective that we may call “broad scope in function-
structure mapping”. If functions-structure connections can be considered independent from other 
function-structure connections, one can search the available spectrum of design solutions to a 
given function. If the realization of a function by a structure would depend on the (prior) 
realization of another function by another structure, the range of structure-function connections 
would decrease. A selection of a particular design solution to a function would then constrain the 
possible design solutions one can choose for functions that must be realized prior to this function. 
By considering function-structure connections as independent, this constraint does not apply. 
Hence, a broad range of functions-structure connections can be considered  
 
Achievement of each of these sub objectives, in turn, all contributes to the main (and common) 
objective of routine designing. The sub objective of accuracy that all the functions in an fmD are 
realized is crucial to the design of any artifact, irrespective of whether it is arrived at in routine or 
innovative fashion. Achievement of the sub objective of establishing knowledge management of 
design rationale – facilitating the consistent archival and cross-communication of design 
knowledge – is clearly instrumental toward the designing of artifacts in collaborative settings. 
And achievement of the sub objective of having broad scope in function-structure mapping, i.e., 
keeping the range of potential structures for functions as broad as possible, may support 
‘innovative/creative’ combinations of structures of an artifact-to-be.  
 
We thus reach the conclusion that the e-values that I considered are appropriate ones for the 
evaluation and choice of fmDs: particular fmDs are suited to achieve particular sub and main 
objectives because these fmDs satisfy particular e-values. This analysis in terms of e-values shows 
that specific models have specific advantages: depending on the e-values (and sub objectives) that 
engineers deem important, specific fmDs are better than others. For instance, if one values 
compatibility of structures, then one better opts for a behavior function fmD; if one values 
independence of function-structure connections, one better picks a purpose function fmD. There is 
not one fmD that satisfies all such engineering values best. Hence, I submit that the usage of 
different fmDs by different engineers is rational from a practical point of view. 
 
A qualification is in order. From the analyzed case it does not automatically follow that functional 
modeling research will not eventually converge toward a single fmD. What the analysis does show 
is that modeling researchers have valid reasons not to do so, and my bet is that they will not. 
Another issue is whether the modeling field will eventually settle on a best behavior function fmD, 
effect function fmD, and purpose function fmD, respectively. Given the current plethora of 
functional modeling accounts, it may turn out at some point in the future that the current situation 
is then interpreted as, say, “pre-paradigmatic”, and accounts will have converged toward, say, 
three best accounts for the modeling of behavior function fmDs, effect function fmDs, and purpose 
function fmDs, respectively. My bet is that this scenario is unlikely as well: closer scrutiny will 
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probably reveal other e-values and sub objectives that are served especially well with particular 
variants of the three considered fmDs. For instance, effect function fmDs in which the functions are 
represented by triggers and effects (see the ”switch on-light on” example in section 3.3) seem 
better suited for failure analysis than effect function fmDs in which functions are represented in 
term of desired output only (e.g. “light on”). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have explained the co-existence of different models of functional decomposition in 
terms of the thesis of methodological incommensurability. I advanced this analysis in terms of the 
thesis’ construal of (non-algorithmic) theory choice in terms of values, expanding this notion to 
the engineering domain. I further argued that co-existence of different models of functional 
decomposition is rational from an instrumental point of view. 
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Endnotes 
1. For instance, the efforts spend in psychiatry and clinical psychology to arrive at unambiguous and shared 
classification criteria for psychiatric disorders as laid down in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) (see American Psychiatric Association: 2000). 
 
2. I use the term “Kuhnian” since the thesis is labeled by some of Kuhn’s commentators as methodological 
incommensurability but not so by Kuhn himself. Whereas Kuhn’s earlier (1970) incommensurability thesis 
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contains both methodological and semantic aspects, he focused in later work more exclusively on semantic notions 
such as translation-failure and taxonomic structure (e.g. 1991). Due to this more specific focus, some 
commentators began to distinguish semantic incommensurability from methodological incommensurability (e.g. 
Sankey 1999). Kuhn’s most explicit treatments of methodological incommensurability can be found in (Kuhn 
1977, 1983). The thesis is currently more frequently discussed under such headings as ‘rationality of theory 
choice’ and ‘epistemological relativism’ (Sankey 1999). 
 
3. The distinction between effect and purpose function is not completely clear-cut: both relate to features of 
behavior. Yet, purpose function descriptions, such as ‘having a rotational force down a shaft’, are, typically, 
phrased in terms of a result of behavior in the environment of a technical artifact. Effect function descriptions, 
such as ‘producing torque’, are phrased in terms of behavioral features of a technical artifact (this distinction 
originates from Chandrasekaran and Josephson (2000) who distinguish between device-centric and environment-
centric descriptions of functions). Behavior functions can be distinguished clearly from effect and purpose 
functions: in behavior function descriptions physical conservation laws are taken into account, whereas this is not 
the case in effect and purpose function descriptions. For instance, in the description ‘producing torque’, the 
conservation of energy is not taken into account. In ‘converting electricity into torque and heat’ the input energy 
of electricity is supposed to equal the output energies of torque and heat, thus taking physical law into account. 
 
4. In (Van Eck 2009, 2011) I analyze a number of accounts in terms of the notions of function and models of 
functional decomposition that they advance. 
 
5. These devices are a part of automatic assembly systems for manufacturing electronic connectors. They are used to 
insert terminals into a housing in order to make a conductor and an insulator one unit (cf. Deng 2002) 
 
6. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not pressing the claim that an objective fixes a specific knowledge usage, which 
in turn fixes what counts as the most adequate model. An objective then would fix the most adequate model. I am, 
rather, advancing the claim that (the choice for) a specific knowledge usage impacts the suitability of a model. The 
choice to employ specific knowledge may differ between modeling accounts, whereas the objective they target is 
the same. For instance, one may envision the design strategy to use known function-structure connections for 
building models in innovative design under the assumption that it reveals when such knowledge is insufficient to 
take care of all required functionalities, indicating that new knowledge on (novel) function-structure connections 
is required (Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001). This differs from the design strategy of Stone and Wood (2000) in 
which knowledge of function-structure connections is explicitly not employed during the construction of models, 
but only after models are built. Both these choices with respect to knowledge use seem sensible ones for 
achievement of the objective of innovative design.  So, knowledge usage in the construction of models is the 
crucial parameter in my analysis to explicate the choice for and co-existence of models.  
 
7. See Worrall (1988) for a more recent defense of a fixed scientific method. 
 
8. Rival in the sense that these theories purport to explain the same or (overlapping) range of phenomena (e.g. Soler: 
2008). Otherwise, incommensurability issues do not arise of course.  
 
9. Semantic incommensurability does not provide the relevant footing for explicating co-existence: translations 
between different fmDs are, after doing some conceptual groundwork, possible. Behavior function fmDs can, for 
instance, be translated into physical behavior models after which the relevant information can be extracted from 
these behavior models to construct effect function fmDs (Van Eck 2009/2010, 2010c). 
 
10. Applying the notion of variation in values to engineering rather than science is unproblematic. Values are not 
specific to science (e.g. McMullin: 1983). In different contexts, in casu science and engineering, values convey the 
(same) idea that a characteristic or property of an item or entity is considered desirable. The more discriminative 
notions of epistemic value and engineering value, of course, are specific to these contexts and relate to different 
items: epistemic values relate to scientific theories, and engineering values relate to fmDs or strategies. 
 
11. E-values relating to knowledge use refer to the process of building fmDs, i.e., to functional decomposition 
strategies. The e-values that I consider in the next section refer to features of fmDs. One can rephrase this process 
feature as a model feature. For instance, not employing known function-structure connections in model building 
can be rephrased as, say, ‘function-structure independency’. In the engineering literature, the term “form-
independent” (Stone and Wood 2000: 359) is often employed. 
 
12. In  (Van Eck 2009) I spell out the claim that these fmDs  are put forward in these accounts. 
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13. I borrow the term spatial organization from the mechanistic explanations-literature (e.g. Machamer et al. 2000). 
 
14. fmDs are the end result or product of a series of design reasoning steps. They are constructed in step-by-step 
fashion by first selecting (from a knowledge base) a function and an associated structure, then it is assessed which 
functionality is solved and which still remains to be solved, then another function and associated structure (that is 
compatible with the first selected structure) are selected, then again an assessment is made of the solved and still 
unsolved functionalities, after which again a function and structure are selected (compatible with the already 
selected structures) etcetera, until these selected functions jointly achieve an overall function/achieve all required 
functionalities (due to the spatial organization of their associated structures). The end result of this process is an 
fmD that satisfies the structural compatibility e-value. 
 
15. To be sure, the constraint that all structures are compatible with one another (and, hence, all functions realized) is 
of course a crucial constraint that is valued in all functional modeling frameworks. Modeling frameworks differ, 
however, in which design phase this value is to be satisfied. In some accounts fmDs should satisfy this value 
(Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001), whereas in others it should be satisfied in later design phases (Deng et al. 2000; 
Deng 2002). Thus, only in some accounts is it a value that applies to fmDs.  
 
16. Perhaps someone might object to this latter conclusion/existence proof on the grounds that the term 
incommensurability should be reserved to a scientific-theoretical context, period. I disagree but if this causes too 
much cognitive dissonance, let us not skirmish over words. My purpose in this paper is to understand co-existence 
of distinct fmDs for the same objective and (expansion into engineering of) the thesis of methodological 
incommensurability allows me to do so.  
 
17. Hoyningen-Huene (1992) endorses a similar position, arguing that values are “something like execution 
procedures” (498) for the ultimate goal of science “to produce general, explanatory theories about the world” 
(499), and that they “concretize this goal in an operationally meaningful way” (499). 
 
18. Chakrabarti indicated – personal communication on August 26, 2009, Stanford, CA, USA – that the account he 
developed with Bligh is explicitly geared toward satisfying these, what I labeled, e-value and sub objective by 
means of the steps described in note 14. The assumption that they are already satisfied when using knowledge of 
existing artifacts in routine designing is in his view often negated by actual design cases.  
